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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND MARKMAN RULINGS: THE CALL
FOR UNIFORMITY

C. JOËL VAN OVER*

I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent cases have decided an issue of first impression important to
patent litigants: whether a trial court’s construction of patent claims pursuant to
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,1 collaterally estops the relitigation of
the construction of the same patent claims in a subsequent suit. In TM Patents,
L.P. v. IBM Corp.,2 the Southern District of New York held that a patentee was
barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating claim
construction issues determined in an earlier case. The earlier case settled
during trial. In Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo International, LLC,3
* © 2001, C. Joël Van Over. Ms. Joël Van Over is a senior counsel with the law firm Swidler
Berlin Shereff Friedman, LLP where she specializes in litigation and intellectual property law.
Ms. Van Over is currently studying for her L.L.M. in Intellectual Property at George Washington
University Law School. The views expressed in this article reflect Ms. Van Over’s views at this
time. Ms. Van Over dedicates this article to her father, Harlan C. Van Over, Ph.D., Saint Louis
University 1974; Professor Emeritus, University of Southern Indiana and Western New Mexico
University; and her mother, Joan S. Van Over, who has encouraged her academic endeavors. Ms.
Van Over also wishes to thank John R. Thomas, Assistant Professor of Law, George Washington
University Law School, for his thoughtful review and helpful comments.
1. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
2. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Since this paper
was written, the court in Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667 (N.D. Ill. 2000),
followed the reasoning of the TM Patents case, and distinguished the Graco case, holding that an
earlier claim construction applies against the patentee in a later case where the earlier claim
construction resulted in a finding of noninfringment. An interlocutory decision issued by the
United States District Court for the district of Connecticut on June 4, 2001 in Edberg v. CPI
International, Inc., No. 3:98CV716(JBA) (Rulings on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment)
also follows the reasoning of TM Patents, holding that the same court’s earlier claim construction
was binding upon the plaintiffs even though the earlier action settled before trial. The author is
co-counsel for defendant CPI International, Inc. in that case. The more recent cases noted here
and infra note 3 further illustrate the divergent positions taken by the courts in TM Patents and
Graco.
3. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa.
1999). The most recent case to consider the preclusive effect of an earlier Markman ruling,
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp., No. 7:99CV00308, 2001 WL 732012 (W.D. Va.
July 29, 2001), held that an earlier Markman ruling does not estop the relitigation of claim
1151
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the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reached the opposite result. The Graco
court held that the claim construction in an earlier case did not preclude
relitigation of the same claim construction issues. The earlier case settled
during an appeal of the trial court’s judgment on a jury verdict finding
infringement.
Although neither of these two recent cases fully explores the
underpinnings of collateral estoppel and the policy implications of applying
collateral estoppel to Markman rulings, the Federal Circuit will no doubt be
asked to do so in the near future. As this Article argues, the Supreme Court
and the Federal Circuit’s sister circuits would seem to favor the application of
collateral estoppel to Markman rulings, at least under the circumstances of
both TM Patents and Graco. The Federal Circuit, however, has generally
taken a conservative approach to collateral estoppel and one that would seem
to support only a restrictive application of collateral estoppel to Markman
rulings. If the Federal Circuit is to offer unifying guidance in this area, it must
take a fresh look at the issue.
If the Federal Circuit fails to find sufficient policy interests in Supreme
Court precedent to support a uniform approach to the collateral estoppel effect
of Markman rulings, the result will be that some circuits mandate collateral
estoppel effect for Markman rulings in most circumstances, while other circuits
prohibit collateral estoppel effect in the same circumstances. Even though the
Federal Circuit applies the law of the local circuit in reviewing a trial court’s
application of collateral estoppel,4 the application of this doctrine to Markman
rulings calls for uniformity. A split among the circuits on the question of the
collateral estoppel effect of Markman rulings would almost certainly guarantee
forum shopping. More basically, the policy goals of Markman, to promote
uniformity in claim construction and to provide clear public notice of the
meaning and scope of the patent grant, arguably would be dealt a severe blow.
This paper addresses to what extent collateral estoppel can and should be
invoked in furthering uniformity of claim construction since Markman. I
address this issue first within the context of the two recent district court cases
reaching different results in their application of collateral estoppel to Markman
rulings. I then review the Federal Circuit’s historical perspective of collateral
estoppel and its apparent readiness to reconsider collateral estoppel in light of
the new Markman regime. I conclude with a discussion of Supreme Court

construction issues where the earlier case was settled and thus not tested on appeal. The court in
the first case denied a motion to vacate its Markman ruling even though settlement was
conditioned upon vacatur. Allen-Bradley Co., L.L.C. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316 (E.D.
Wisc. 2001).
4. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1381 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
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precedent and policy issues and suggest, as I do throughout, that collateral
estoppel should apply to Markman rulings as broadly as “fairness” permits.5
II. TM PATENTS AND GRACO
The courts in both TM Patents and Graco recognized that Markman
creates new issues concerning the collateral estoppel effects of Markman
rulings on subsequent claim construction.6 As the TM Patents court explained:
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s ruling [in Markman] in 1995, disputes concerning
the meaning of patent claims were submitted to a jury along with questions
about validity and infringement. Thus, until there was a final judgment after a
jury verdict, there was no construction of claims [citation omitted], and hence,
no finality for collateral estoppel purposes. However, after Markman, claim
construction became a separate legal issue, for determination by the Court . . . .
The jury is not free to override the Court’s construction of the disputed terms.
It is hard to see how much more “final” a determination could be.7

While the TM Patents court was ultimately persuaded that the new
Markman regime was decisive in expanding the role of collateral estoppel in
claim construction matters, the Graco court was not. Before evaluating the
respective merits of these apparently divergent decisions, it is first necessary to
understand the issues presented to each court and each court’s respective
analysis of these issues.
A.

TM Patents

The issue presented in TM Patents was whether a trial court’s earlier
Markman ruling was binding on the patent holder in a second case where the
earlier case settled during trial. The court in TM Patents applied a four-part
test to determine whether a prior Markman ruling precluded relitigation of
claim construction issues in a subsequent case.8 The elements of this test are:
First, the issues raised in both proceedings must be identical. Second, the
relevant issues must have actually been litigated and decided in the prior
proceeding. Third, the party to be estopped must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issues in that prior proceeding. And fourth,
resolution of the issues must have been necessary to support a valid and final
judgment on the merits.9

The parties in TM Patents agreed that the first and third prongs of the test
had been met. They disagreed on the second and fourth prongs. The court
5. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 323 (1971).
6. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376; Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 662-63.
7. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
8. Id. at 375.
9. Id. (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Emprea Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d
359, 368 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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found that the issue of finality (the fourth element) “subsumed” the question of
whether the issue had actually been decided in the prior case (the second
element).10 Thus, the critical issue for the court was whether a Markman
ruling could be considered “final” when the dispute over the meaning of claim
terms was never reduced to final judgment “because the matter was settled
before the jury had returned its verdict on the question of infringement.”11 TM
Patents argued that if there is no final, appealable judgment, there can be no
“finality” for collateral estoppel purposes.12
The court flatly rejected this argument: “Unfortunately for TM, that is not
the law in this Circuit (or any other, for that matter).”13 The court relied on
Judge Friendly’s “seminal opinion” in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil
Refining Co.14 In that opinion Judge Friendly explained that finality for
purposes of collateral estoppel is not the same as finality under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, which speaks only to finality for purposes of appeal.15 The Lummus test
for finality in the collateral estoppel context, rather, depends upon
such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly
tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review. . . .
‘Finality’ in the context [of collateral estoppel] may mean little more than that
the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no
really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.16

Relying upon a later decision decided under Lummus, the court pointed out that
interlocutory orders, such as summary judgment decisions, may estop
relitigation of issues decided by summary judgment.17 Thus, collateral
estoppel “does not require a ‘judgment which ends the litigation . . . and leaves
nothing more for the court to do but execute the judgment’ . . . but includes
many dispositions which, although not final in that sense, have nevertheless
been fully litigated.”18
The TM Patents court had no difficulty in holding, under the teachings of
Lummus and its progeny, that the patent holder was foreclosed from
relitigating the meaning of claim limitations decided in the previous case’s

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
13. Id.
14. 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962).
15. Id. at 89.
16. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (quoting Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89).
17. Id. at 376 (citing Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y.
1981)).
18. Id. at 376 (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944,
955 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (holding a decision on liability that is affirmed on appeal is
entitled to collateral estoppel effect even though damages phase of trial not complete and no
judgment entered)).
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Markman ruling.19 In reaching this conclusion the court found that under the
new Markman regime, courts typically require the parties to litigate claim
construction disputes prior to trial so that the court can instruct the jury on the
meaning of the patent prior to trial.20 “Moreover, the Court limits itself to
construing that which is necessary to the resolution of the questions of
infringement and validity.”21 As the jury is “not free to override the Court’s
construction of disputed terms, [i]t is hard to see how much more ‘final’ a
determination could be.”22
Concerning whether the parties were entitled to a “full and fair hearing,”
the court found that the prior district court conducted a two-day Markman
hearing, heard evidence, and issued a thorough ruling. The court then accepted
further briefing and heard re-argument and made modifications to its ruling.23
The ruling was a fully litigated determination.24 Concerning finality, the court
then instructed the jury on the ruling and gave each juror a copy of the
instruction to guide them during the course of trial. As the TM Patents court
found, “[a] verdict would not have changed anything about [the] Markman
rulings. Nothing more remained to be adjudicated; nothing more remained to
be decided on the issue of claim construction.”25
The TM Patents court concluded that
[a]fter Markman, with its requirement that the Court construe the patent for the
jury as a matter of law, it is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination
after a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions
involving the same disputed claims under the same patent. The nature of the
Markman proceeding is such that finality is its aim.26

If TM Patents was correct that a Markman ruling is a final determination of
claim construction, at least at the trial court level, then once settlement occurs,
the Markman ruling becomes final for all purposes. By relinquishing any right
to appeal, the parties effectively waived any argument that the ruling was not
final, as well as any argument that either party did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the first time.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 379.
Id. at 376.
TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 377.
Id.
TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 377.
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Graco

The Graco court also considered the preclusive effect of a prior Markman
ruling in a case that settled.27 The Markman ruling in the prior case was issued
following briefing and argument, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury in
the prior case found that each of the patent claims at issue, as construed by the
court, had been infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. However, during
litigation of the meaning of disputed terms of the claims, the patent holder had
argued for a broader interpretation of the claims than that adopted by the court.
The accused infringer appealed and the patent holder filed a protective crossappeal, but did not appeal claim construction. The case settled while the
appeal was pending.
In the second case, the patent holder again urged a broad claim
construction and the accused infringer argued that collateral estoppel barred
the broader interpretation rejected during the prior Markman claim
construction. The issue, as articulated by the Graco court, was whether
collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the earlier claim construction when the
patentee could not have appealed the claim construction as of right.
The Graco court cited the four-part test for determining the propriety of
collateral estoppel, as enunciated by the Federal Circuit in A.B. Dick Co. v.
Burroughs Corp.,28 as follows:
(1) the issue sought to be litigated is identical to one decided in a prior action;
(2) the issue is actually litigated in the prior action; (3) resolution of the issue
is essential to a final judgment in the prior action; and (4) the party against
whom collateral estoppel is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
issue in the first action.29

Rather than discussing this four-part test explicitly, the Graco court focused on
two related issues: (1) whether the earlier claim construction had been essential
to the judgment and (2) whether collateral estoppel could apply when the issue
sought to be given preclusive effect was not itself appealable as of right.30
These questions relate to prongs three and four of the collateral estoppel
inquiry, respectively.
The Graco court found, as to the first issue, that issue preclusion does not
apply unless the claim construction was “the reason for the loss” in the prior
case.31 Because Graco did not lose in the prior litigation, the Graco court

27. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l, LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 661 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
28. 713 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
29. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 662. This test is essentially the same as that used by the TM
Patents court, although the statement of the third prong of the test in Graco differs slightly from
the TM Patents recitation of that prong.
30. Id. at 664.
31. Id. (citing In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
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reasoned that the earlier court’s claim construction was “not essential to the
final judgment in that case.”32 On the second issue, concerning whether the
prior claim construction was itself appealable, the Graco court found that it
was not.33 Graco prevailed in the first infringement suit. Thus, even though
Graco may have lost on the issue of claim construction, it could not have
separately appealed this issue without this independent right to appeal claim
construction, the Graco court held, and Graco was free to relitigate claim
construction against a new defendant.34 To support its conclusion, the Graco
court relied on the Federal Circuit’s pre-Markman decision in Jackson Jordan,
Inc. v. Plasser American Corp.35 Jackson Jordan held that collateral estoppel
does not apply against a patentee that prevailed on the issue of infringement in
a first action despite a narrow claim construction.36 Graco, like Jackson
Jordan, cited section 28(1) of the Restatement of Judgments,37 which provides
that issue preclusion does not apply when the party against whom collateral
estoppel is invoked “could not, as a matter of law have obtained review of the
judgment in the initial action.”38
The Graco court was unpersuaded by the fact that, in the prior case, the
infringer had appealed, and the patent holder had cross-appealed, but had
declined specifically to appeal the issue of claim construction.39 The court
refused to look beyond the fact that Graco could not have appealed claim
construction by itself in the first action.40
Finally, although the Graco court recognized that “uniformity in the
treatment of a given patent” was one of the paramount reasons cited by the
Supreme Court in Markman to support treating claim construction as an issue
of law for the court, it found that this goal was insufficient to overcome what it
perceived were precedential limitations to the application of collateral
estoppel.41
C. TM Patents and Graco Compared
Although the TM Patents and Graco courts reach different results, the first
question is whether the different postures of the original actions merited these
different results. The critical difference between the two cases is that in TM

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 665. Accord Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp., No.
7:99CV00308, 2001 WL 732012 (W.D. Va. July 29, 2001).
35. 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
36. Id.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(1) (1982).
38. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663–64; Jackson Jordan, 747 F.2d at 1576.
39. Graco, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 664–65.
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Patents settlement occurred before the jury reached a verdict, while in Graco
the settlement occurred after a verdict of infringement and during appeal.
As noted, the Graco decision turned on the court’s finding that because the
patent holder had no right to appeal an overly narrow claim construction,
collateral estoppel did not apply. Although not cited, there is Third Circuit law
that supports the proposition that collateral estoppel does not apply when the
party against whom estoppel is asserted has no right to appeal the judgment in
the original action.42 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Jackson Jordan is in
accord.43
Arguably, the Graco court misapplied the general rule that collateral
estoppel does not apply against a party that could not have appealed the issue
to be precluded. In Graco, the infringer appealed the judgment of
infringement and the patent holder cross-appealed. While the patent holder did
not expressly appeal the issue of claim construction, it could have. Moreover,
the issue of claim construction was in fact before the Federal Circuit as claim
construction is a necessary component of the infringement analysis. When the
Federal Circuit reviews a judgment of infringement, it always reviews the trial
court’s claim construction. As the Federal Circuit recently explained:
Analysis of patent infringement starts with “construction” of the claim,
whereby the court establishes the scope and limits of the claim, interprets any
technical or other terms whose meaning is at issue, and thereby defines the
claim with greater precision than had the patentee. . . . On appeal the Federal
Circuit is required to construe the claim de novo; thus we do so without
deference to the rulings of the trial court.44

Thus, to preclude collateral estoppel when an appeal has been taken would
seem to put form over substance, at least on the facts of Graco.
If claim construction issues were within the purview of appellate review,
then the issue is whether the parties waived their rights to appellate review. As
a general rule, when an appeal is mooted by settlement, the parties seeking
review have “forfeited [their] legal remedy by the ordinary processes of appeal
and certiorari . . . .”45 The issues decided by the trial court are, in this instance,
final, and relitigation of the same issues is foreclosed.46

42. See, e.g., Powers v. Southland Corp., 4 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding issue
preclusion does not attach if the party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of
law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action).
43. Jackson Jordan Inc. v. Plasser Am. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
44. Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc., 181 F.3d 1305, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
45. Philips Elects. N. Am. Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 96-1426, 1997 WL 652399
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1997) (unpublished opinion) (denying vacatur when appeal mooted by
settlement).
46. Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1989) (collateral estoppel
applies when the issue has been fully adjudicated, regardless of a subsequent settlement).
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The more important question may be, however, whether the policies
enunciated in the Markman decision itself are sufficient to merit a fresh look at
collateral estoppel when a Markman ruling has construed the terms of a patent.
The TM Patents court found that the policy goals relied upon by the Supreme
Court in Markman—promoting uniformity in claim construction and public
notice of the scope of patent claims—required such a fresh look.
The Markman ruling at issue for collateral estoppel purposes in TM
Patents was the only arguably final ruling in the case. No judgment was issued
because the parties settled during the trial. Thus, there was no prevailing party.
This is significant because collateral estoppel is generally used, as it was in
Blonder-Tongue, against the party that loses in the original action. It is the
loser that has the right to appeal. However, when there is only a Markman
ruling at issue for collateral estoppel purposes in a prior action because of
settlement, the issue of who won or lost should not arise. Both parties waived
their rights of appeal.47
The TM Patents court did not address the issue of whether the patent
holder against whom estoppel was asserted had won or lost its claim
construction position in the earlier suit. The court focused instead on the
finality of the Markman ruling. If the ruling was final, it could be used for
collateral estoppel purposes, period.
This approach seems sensible enough on the facts of TM Patents because
the parties settled before a judgment could be reached. The TM Patents court
assumed that the claim construction could have been appealed “but for” the
settlement. It therefore relied on both parties’ relinquishment of appeal rights
to bar the argument that there was no right of appeal.
In Graco, the court knew who won the ultimate judgment—the patent
holder—despite a narrower than requested claim construction. Thus, the
Graco decision faced directly the issue that the patent holder had no
independent right of appeal. While the court could have decided the issue as in
TM Patents, based upon the waiver of appeal by settlement, it did not. The
court relied on pre-Markman collateral estoppel precedent rather than
undertaking a thorough review of whether this precedent should apply postMarkman.

47. It may also be reasonable to assume that the party against whom collateral estoppel is
sought to be imposed has in some sense lost on the issue of claim construction. Moreover, this
fact would generally be apparent from the Markman ruling itself, when a patent holder’s
advocated construction is not wholly adopted in the ruling. As the Federal Circuit has
recognized, a patent holder can lose on its position in claim construction, but win on the issue of
infringement. Jackson Jordan, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1577-1578 (“[A] party can be said to have ‘lost’
if it urged a broad scope of the claim, and the court upheld validity on a narrower interpretation”).
The Federal Circuit in Jackson Jordan held that there is no collateral estoppel in this instance
because the issue was not appealable. Id. at 1578.
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The Graco Court also found that the Markman ruling in the first case was
not essential to the final judgment in that case because the patent holder
prevailed. This is wrong as a matter of law. Claim construction is always
essential to final judgment of infringement, no matter whether the patent
holder loses or prevails. As the TM Patents court aptly reasoned on this score,
the claim construction issues actually litigated are those essential to the parties’
dispute.48
In sum, TM Patents is the better reasoned opinion. The opinion balances
the practical realities of the Markman ruling process in infringement litigation
with the traditional elements of a collateral estoppel analysis. The opinion also
gives due regard for the policies and purpose of Markman claim construction
as set forth in the Supreme Court’s Markman decision. The Graco opinion, on
the other hand, takes an unduly restrictive view of the Blonder-Tongue test.
Graco’s superficial analysis ignores the fact that claim construction is always
reviewed by the Federal Circuit in its review of a judgment of infringement,
and misapprehends the impact of settlement. The Markman ruling at issue in
Graco should have been accorded preclusive effect for this reason and the
reasons set forth in TM Patents.
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
If the Federal Circuit is to take a fresh look at the collateral estoppel effect
of Markman rulings, as it may soon be asked to do if either TM Patents or
Graco is appealed, it must be convinced that it can do so based upon its own
and other precedents, and that it should do so based upon sound patent policy.
These issues are explored in the next two sections.
For a Markman ruling to be granted preclusive effect under the four-part
test most frequently used by the Federal Circuit and set forth here for
reference, the issues are:
(1) whether claim construction issues in the second suit are identical to
those decided in the first action;
(2) whether the claim construction subject to estoppel was actually litigated
in the first action;
(3) whether the claim construction issues decided in the first action were
essential to final judgment in the first action; and
(4) whether the party against whom estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in the prior court proceeding the issue he seeks
to relitigate in the second action.49
48. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
49. While this four-part test is the similar in most respects to the tests employed by other
circuits, it is not identical. See, e.g., Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc., 59 F.
Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1999); In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465-67 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Whether Claim Construction Issues Are Identical to Those Decided in the
First Action

When the claims construed in the first action are the same as those
construed in the second action, the inquiry of whether claim construction
issues are identical, for purposes of collateral estoppel, is straightforward. The
court applying collateral estoppel need only look to the terms of the claims
construed in both actions to determine whether the issues presented are the
same.50 This was not an issue in either TM Patents or Graco.
The issue of identicality of previously litigated issues arises most
frequently when the first action concerns claim construction of the original
patent, and the second action concerns a reissue patent or one that has been reexamined. The issue of identicality also arises when a parent patent is the
subject of the first suit, and a continuation patent is the subject of the second.
In Gould v. Mossinghoff, the issue was whether the Patent and Trade
Office (PTO) had properly rejected continuation patent claims because the
patentee had lost an earlier interference based upon his failure to adequately
disclose his claimed invention.51 The PTO argued that because the patent
holder, Gould, had lost two interference proceedings based on findings that he
had inadequately disclosed the claimed inventions, he should be estopped from
asserting that a later continuation application adequately disclosed the covered
invention. The continuation could be construed to cover the invention that had
been determined in the earlier interference to be inadequately disclosed.52
The district court agreed with the PTO that the interference collaterally
estopped the patentee’s argument that it had adequately disclosed the invention
claimed in the continuation application. Although the continuation application
claimed an invention not previously litigated in the interference, the
continuation could also be construed to cover the invention that the PTO had
found to be inadequately disclosed in the interference.
The court of appeals denied collateral estoppel effect because the
continuation application claimed an invention which was adequately disclosed
in the parent application. The court found that it was immaterial that the
claims in the continuation application also covered an invention that had been

50. See Molinaro v. Fannon/Courier Corp., 745 F.2d 651 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hilgraeve Corp.
v. Symantec Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 850, 854 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding the proper construction
of claims 1 and 18 is the identical issue previously adjudicated).
51. Gould v. Mossinghoff, 711 F.2d 396 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
52. Id. at 399. During the PTO’s examination of the continuation application, the examiner
refused to issue the patent because the claimed invention was inadequately disclosed. The
examiner did not assert collateral estoppel based on the earlier interference proceedings. The
PTO, however, argued collateral estoppel on appeal to the district court.
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inadequately disclosed in the parent patent.53 The court explained that “a claim
can be sustained even if it covers other inoperative or inadequately disclosed
forms of the invention.”54 Thus, the court looked “to the claimed invention as
the measure of issue identity.”55 The appeals court did not find that the
claimed invention was patentable, but rather remanded the ultimate issue to the
district court to consider without the benefit of collateral estoppel. The court
limited its holding as follows: “We simply hold that findings made in
proceedings involving inventions different from the invention presently
claimed do not conclusively bar [the patent applicant] from attempting to prove
entitlement to [the filing date of the parent application].”56
The Federal Circuit also took a similar “claims level” approach in
Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil.57 In that case, a federal district court had
found the claims of the original patent invalid for obviousness. The patentee
sought and obtained a reissue patent and sued the same accused infringer on
the reissue patent. The accused infringer asserted collateral estoppel based
upon the earlier invalidity decision. To apply collateral estoppel in this
context, the district court compared the original and reissue claims and then
applied prior art only to the differences between these claims. The district
court agreed that collateral estoppel applied, to the extent that the original and
reissue claims were the same, and found the reissue claims invalid for
obviousness.
The Federal Circuit rejected the district court’s approach of applying prior
art only to the differences between an original and reissue claim, requiring
instead an obviousness analysis on the entire reissue claim as a whole. Thus,
at least in the obviousness context, it appears that the determination of whether
an original claim and a reissue claim raises substantially identical issues cannot
be determined by a comparison of the differences between the claims. If the
claims differ at all, then the reissue claim must be evaluated without regard to
collateral estoppel. As the Federal Circuit stated:
The issue here on appeal is the validity of the claims of the reissue patent, an
issue that did not exist at the time of the decision on validity of the ‘282 patent
claims. There is no estoppel against appellate review of all aspects pertinent to
the decision on the reissue claims.58

53. Id. at 400.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Gould, 711 F.2d at 400.
57. 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 1136; accord MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (holding collateral estoppel does not apply where differences in claim scope between
claims of two related patents raise potentially determinative issues that have not been previously
adjudicated when claims in earlier litigation were found anticipated).
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In a post-Markman case, Foster v. Hallco Manufacturing Co.,59 the
Federal Circuit addressed whether a district court’s claim construction in a first
action precluded relitigation of the meaning of the same language in a second
action on the reissue patent. The district court in the second action found that
collateral estoppel did not apply. Although the original patent and the reissue
patent used similar claim language, the court found that the reissue patent
contained a more specific definition of the disputed claim term than the
original patent.60 The Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel was properly
denied because the issues in the two actions were not identical.
What is interesting about the Foster case is not its holding but rather the
fact that it was the patentee that was advocating issue preclusion based upon
the claim construction from the first action. Moreover, the patentee advocated
issue preclusion even though it lost the first action, as several of the original
claims were found invalid in that action. The patentee argued to the Federal
Circuit that the second district court had erred by not adopting the “fixed”
claim interpretation which had been adopted by the trial court in the first
action.61 Because the Federal Circuit found that the issues in the two actions
were not identical, it did not reach the issue of whether Markman “requires that
the first claim construction of a patent litigated to final judgment is the ‘fixed’
claim construction for that patent.”62 The Federal Circuit gave no indication of
how it would have ruled had it reached this issue.
While these cases in no way indicate that the Federal Circuit will apply an
overly restrictive “issue identicality” standard in the claim construction
context, other cases indicate that the Federal Circuit will have to divorce itself
from pre-Markman statements that claim construction depends in some fashion
on the nature of the accused device.
The Federal Circuit’s philosophy, as articulated in its more frequently cited
cases on the subject, is that claim construction depends in some way upon the
particular accused device at issue. In Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.,63 the
Federal Circuit summarized its position on collateral estoppel in the
infringement context as follows: “[J]udicial statements regarding the scope of
patent claims are hypothetical insofar as they purport to resolve the question of
whether . . . products not before the court would . . . infringe the patent
claims.”64

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
1983)).

No. 96-1399, 1997 WL 419391 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 1997).
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
5 F.3d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Id. at 517 (quoting A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir.
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And, in the same vein: “A device not previously before the court, and
shown to differ from those structures previously litigated, requires
determination on its own facts.”65
The origin of these statements is the Federal Circuit’s decision in A.B. Dick
Co. v. Burroughs Corp.66 In A.B. Dick Co., the Federal Circuit considered
collateral estoppel of a prior claim construction decided in a declaratory
judgment action. The accused infringer, the declaratory judgment plaintiff,
raised issues of invalidity and noninfringement. The declaratory judgment
court construed certain patent claims and held that the patent was “limited in
scope to oscillographic recording.”67 The question in A.B. Dick was whether
this statement collaterally estopped the patentee in a later infringement action.
In the later action, the trial court granted summary judgment to the accused
infringer on the basis of this statement. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding
that the statement was not necessary to the final judgment in the first case. The
Federal Circuit went further, however, arguably displaying the court’s general
discomfort with collateral estoppel. The accused product at issue in the
declaratory judgment action and the accused product before the Federal Circuit
in A.B. Dick functioned quite differently, but neither was an “oscillograph.”68
Notwithstanding this similarity and the earlier court’s judgment that the patent
did not cover “oscillographic equipment,” the Federal Circuit stated:
Except in the context of validity or infringement, judicial statements regarding
the scope of patent claims are hypothetical insofar as they purport to resolve
the question of whether prior art or products not before the court would,
respectively, anticipate or infringe the patent claims. Regardless of whether
the Mead court had jurisdiction to rule on the abstract scope of patent claims,
we are persuaded that it would be unfair to give such a ruling collateral
estoppel effect.69

The Federal Circuit’s statements in A.B. Dick and its progeny limiting the
preclusive effect of claim construction in a later action because the later action
involved a different product may have been supportable on pragmatic grounds
pre-Markman. Pre-Markman, issues of claim construction and infringement
were both decided by the fact finder, and were thus intertwined. This is not the
case post-Markman. A determination of infringement today involves a twostep process in every sense: first, the patent claims must be given their proper
legal construction, and only then can the properly construed claims be
compared to the accused device.70 Since Markman, the first step is decided by
65. Id. (quoting Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1987)).
66. 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 702.
68. Id. at 703.
69. Id. at 704.
70. ATD Corp. v. Lydall, Inc., 159 F.3d 534, 539-40 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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the court as a final matter, and the second step is performed by the fact finder,
most typically the jury. Moreover, the first step is performed without regard to
the accused device.71
B.

Whether the Claim Construction Subject to Estoppel was Actually
Litigated in the First Action

As the TM Patents court found, in the context of a Markman claim
construction ruling, the issue of whether claim construction was actually
litigated in a prior action is subsumed by the issue of finality, meaning,
whether the determination of claim construction was litigated in a manner
sufficiently final for collateral estoppel purposes.72 Thus, the TM Patents court
assumed that the Markman hearing in the first action was sufficient to satisfy
the “actually litigated” requirement as long as the claim construction ruling
was final and no opportunity to relitigate claim construction existed in the first
action.73 The Federal Circuit has provided consistent guidance on the “actually
litigated” requirement.
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of what constitutes actual litigation
of a claim construction issue in prior litigation in In re Freeman.74 In that case
the district court in the first action construed the meaning of a critical term and
found no infringement based upon that construction.75 The Federal Circuit
affirmed, finding that the district court’s construction of the critical term was
not erroneous.76 The patentee then sought re-examination in an attempt to
redefine the critical term so as to avoid the district court’s construction. The
PTO examiner rejected certain claims of the re-examination application on the
ground that these claims impermissibly sought to broaden the claim in a reexamination proceeding.77 The patentee appealed the rejection to the Board.
The Board did not agree with the interpretation of the reissue claims by the
district court in the first action but nevertheless affirmed the examiner because
“it found itself to be ‘constrained to accept the court’s interpretation of the
claim language of the reissue claims.’”78 The patentee then appealed to the
Federal Circuit.

71. PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
72. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
73. Id. The Graco court did not question that the claim construction at issue had been
actually litigated in the first action but denied collateral estoppel effect because the patentee had
no right to appeal that construction. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l., LLC, 77 F.
Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
74. 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
75. Id. at 1462.
76. Id. at 1463.
77. Id. at 1461.
78. Id. at 1464.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1166

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1151

The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Board was bound
by the district court’s interpretation of the claim language at issue in the reexamination.79 The Federal Circuit noted that “[t]he underlying rationale of
the doctrine of issue preclusion is that a party who has litigated an issue and
lost should be bound by that decision and cannot demand that the issue be
decided over again,” and after finding that the same claim language was at
issue before the district court and the examiner on re-examination, the Federal
Circuit reached the issue of whether the issue had been “actually decided.”80
The Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he requirement that the issue have been
actually decided is generally satisfied if the parties to the original action
disputed the issue and the trier of fact decided it.”81 The court found that the
claim language at issue in the re-examination had been disputed by the parties
before the district court, and that, in fact, “most of the trial involved
interpreting this [language].”82 The district court resolved the meaning of this
language and did so in favor of the accused infringer.83
If as found in Freeman, “actually litigated” in a claim construction context
means “disputed” and “decided” at the trial court level, then all Markman
rulings would necessarily reflect that the claim construction issues addressed
were “actually litigated.” Thus, as TM Patents found, the “actually litigated”
requirement will generally be subsumed by the finality requirement. The only
issue arising in the context of a Markman ruling should be whether the claim
construction issues decided in a Markman ruling are sufficiently final to be
granted preclusive effect.
C. Whether Claim Construction Issues Decided in the First Action Were
Essential to Final Judgment in the First Action
Under Federal Circuit cases, the requirement that collateral estoppel apply
only to issues that were essential to a final judgment would seem to imply two
concepts: essentiality and finality.84 In the context of Markman ruling
collateral estoppel, these concepts arguably merge. The TM Patents court
found that Markman rulings are always essential to a final judgment because
parties litigate only those claim construction issues that are relevant to the
merits of their claims and defenses.85 Thus, the claim construction issues
79. Freeman, 30 F.3d at 1465.
80. Id. at 1466.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. This issue of finality also arises in answering the last question of the collateral estoppel
inquiry: whether the issue to be precluded was fully and fairly litigated the first time, discussed
infra Section III.D.
85. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376 (“the Court limits itself to construing that which is
necessary to the resolution of the questions of infringement and validity”).
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litigated are by definition “essential” to any final judgment. There is much
more to be said, however, on the issue of finality.
In virtually every case where the Federal Circuit has granted preclusive
effect to an issue decided in a previous case, the prior issue was the subject of a
final appealable judgment.86 The Federal Circuit has denied preclusive effect
to a final interlocutory ruling when it has not been certified for appeal.87 Thus,
under the Federal Circuit’s current case law, the court would not grant
preclusive effect to a Markman ruling in a later case where the first case settled
before a final judgment was entered. As the TM Patents court pointed out, this
is contrary to Judge Friendly’s seminal Second Circuit opinion in Lummus and
decisions in other circuits that have reached the issue. Most courts hold that an
issue that has been fully adjudicated and decided by a final interlocutory order
is entitled to preclusive effect.88 When the parties settle following the court’s
entry of a final interlocutory order, an even stronger case can be made.89
Parties that settle willingly relinquish their rights to appeal.90 The parties
voluntarily relinquished their right to have the interlocutory order become final
and appealable.91
The Supreme Court in U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall
Partnership92 embraced this concept when it held that lower court judgments
should not be vacated when the parties settle while an appeal is pending,
86. See, e.g., Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985). There are
arguably two exceptions. In Hartley v. Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1989), the
Federal Circuit granted preclusive effect to a final ruling on patent invalidity even though a
stipulated judgment had been entered following settlement. The Federal Circuit held that the
invalidity judgment precluded relitigation of this issue because the loser voluntarily relinquished
his right of appeal. The second case, Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999), is discussed infra text accompanying notes 118-126.
87. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999). There, the Federal Circuit held
that collateral estoppel applies, and “[f]inality should attach for claim preclusion purposes at the
time of entry of judgment” despite an unresolved motion for JMOL/new trial. Id. at 1381. The
Federal Circuit went on to say, however, the if the judgment was reversed, the district court could
modify its judgment accordingly. Id. at 1382.
88. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76. Following Lummus, courts have held that issues
decided in interlocutory summary judgment orders may have preclusive effect. See, e.g.,
Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines, 512 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); John Morrell & Co. v.
Local Union 304A, 913 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a jury verdict not immediately
appealable because damages phase incomplete is preclusive for collateral estoppel purposes);
Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1102 (1980) (an interlocutory appeal from a preliminary injunction “will be given
preclusive effect if it is necessarily based upon a determination that constitutes an insuperable
obstacle to the plaintiff’s success on the merits.”).
89. See, e.g., Wellons, Inc. v. T.E. Ibberson Co., 869 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1989).
90. See Carpenter v. Young, 773 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (plaintiffs waived right of
review when they settled following summary judgment).
91. Id.
92. 513 U.S. 18 (1994).
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absent exceptional circumstances.93 The Court found that where a court’s
judgment is mooted by the parties’ voluntary action, it is not in the public
interest to permit a “secondary remedy of vacatur as a refined form of
collateral attack on the judgment . . . .”94 Such a collateral attack “would—
quite apart from any considerations of fairness to the parties—disturb the
orderly operation of the federal judicial system.”95 The Court further noted, in
often quoted language, that “[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct
and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not merely the
property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that the
public interest would be served by a vacatur.”96
Significantly, the Supreme Court was not persuaded by the argument that
district court judgments should be vacated more readily than appellate
decisions “since district-court judgments are subject to review as of right.”97
The Court rejected this argument, stating that it is inappropriate to vacate a
judgment “on the basis of assumptions about the merits.”98
The Bonner Mall case supports the argument that a final Markman claim
construction ruling should not be erased simply because the parties have
settled. If the ruling is a final determination of the meaning of a patent claim
by the district court, the fact that it is interlocutory should not be decisive. The
TM Patents court essentially found just this. If a Markman ruling is final for
all purposes at the district court level, it is every bit as final as a final
judgment. As the TM Patents court explained:
After Markman, with its requirement that the Court construe the patent for the
jury as a matter of law, it is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination
after a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions

93. Id. at 29.
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citation omitted).
97. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 28. It seems well settled that the correctness of a judgment is
not at issue when determining the preclusive effect of that judgment unless the error is so
egregious as to amount to a failure of the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate an issue.
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971); Bates v. Union
Oil Co. of Cal., 944 F.2d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1005 (1992) (not unfair
to apply collateral estoppel even though the judgment may not be free of legal error). Although
the Federal Circuit acknowledged this rule in Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 170 F.3d at 1380, it
expressly reserved for the district court the opportunity to modify its reliance on collateral
estoppel if there was a reversal in the prior action. Id. at 1382.
98. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added); see also Federated Dep’t Stores v.
Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981) (an unappealed judgment is entitled to preclusive effect regardless of
whether it was wrongly decided).
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involving the same disputed claims under the same patent. The nature of the
Markman proceeding is such that finality is its aim.99

A recent case, Security People Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc.,100
explores the distinction between “finality” for issue preclusion purposes and
finality for purposes of appeal. In that case, the court held that an interlocutory
summary judgment order deciding claim construction and infringement issues
should be final for collateral estoppel purposes. The court found that “[a]
disposition by summary judgment is a decision on the merits, and it is as final
and conclusive as a judgment after trial.”101
As the Security People court explained:
to be ‘final’ for collateral estoppel purposes, a decision need not possess
‘finality’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Instead, a final judgment for
purposes of collateral estoppel is any prior adjudication of an issue in another
action that is determined to be ‘sufficiently final’ to be accorded preclusive
effect.102

The factors for determining whether a decision is sufficiently firm to be
accorded preclusive effect are: “(1) whether the decision was not avowedly
tentative, (2) whether the parties were fully heard, (3) whether the court
supported its decision with a reasoned opinion, and (4) whether the decision
was subject to an appeal.”103 Under these factors, an independent Markman
ruling or a Markman ruling made within the context of a summary judgment
order should be considered sufficiently final for collateral estoppel purposes, at
least when the parties have settled under the circumstances of either the
TM Patents or Graco cases. The first three factors are satisfied in virtually
every Markman ruling. The fourth factor, whether the decision was subject to
appeal, would present the only open issue. In cases like TM Patents and
Graco, where the parties have settled, this factor has been met. When the
parties have settled they elect the point at which finality attaches. Settling
parties have, by definition, forfeited any right of appeal. When the parties
have not settled, and thus waived their right to appellate review, moreover,
issue preclusion would arguably still be appropriate.

99. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The TM
Patents court relied upon United States v. McGann, 951 F. Supp. 372, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(“Lummus has been consistently followed by every circuit which has had occasion to address the
issue” (citations omitted)). See also Sackman v. Liggett Group, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.N.Y.
1999) (adverse discovery orders not vacated where intensely litigated and should be part of the
developing decisional law in this area).
100. 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
101. Id. at 1045.
102. Id.
103. Id. Note that under this test, whether the decision is subject to appeal is only one factor,
and thus alone is not necessarily decisive.
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As the Lummus and TM Patents courts held, the issue of finality for
collateral estoppel purposes properly focuses upon whether the issue decided
in the first case was considered final for purposes of that litigation. If one
imposes the additional finality inquiry concerning whether the decision was
subject to appeal, the issue is whether a final interlocutory order is appealable.
While most interlocutory orders are not subject to appeal as of right, an
interlocutory Markman ruling, like a summary judgment order, may be
appealed if a district court certifies the issue for appeal sua sponte, or upon
request of a party.104 A Markman ruling, therefore, is subject to appeal as a
final interlocutory order, at least in theory. Practically, however, the Federal
Circuit has consistently refused to review interlocutory Markman rulings.105
The Federal Circuit’s practice does not square with the policies of Markman,
and the Federal Circuit’s own recognition that claim construction is usually
dispositive of the patent holder’s claim of infringement.106 The practice of
refusing to review interlocutory Markman rulings does not serve the interest of
judicial economy.107
The Federal Circuit’s reluctance to review interlocutory Markman rulings,
however, should not determine the issue of finality. If a circuit court’s policy
on denying interlocutory appeals was decisive, no interlocutory order would be
considered final for purposes of collateral estoppel. This, of course, is not the
law in most circuits. As noted earlier, finality is more properly viewed as
finality from the point of view of the trial court. If the trial court views an
interlocutory decision as final, it should be viewed as final for purposes of

104. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), (c)(1) (1994).
105. See, e.g., Arthrocare Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 555, 1998 WL 568690 (Fed. Cir. Aug.
20, 1998); Microchip Tech., Inc. v. Scenix Semiconductor, Inc., Nos. 558, 559, 1998 WL 743923
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 1998). It should be noted in this regard that the Federal Circuit could change
its current policy of declining to review Markman rulings prior to final judgment on the merits.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that a prevailing party on the merits may appeal an
adverse collateral ruling if it retains a stake in the controversy. Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980). Such collateral rulings are appealable after final judgment. Id. at
334. It would certainly seem that a patent holder who loses on claim construction, but wins on
infringement, retains a sufficient stake in the controversy concerning the proper scope of his
patent rights. If he is sufficiently aggrieved, he may appeal. This avenue would dispose of the
Graco court’s concern (and the Federal Circuit’s concern in pre-Markman decisions) that a patent
holder that loses in the Markman ruling, but prevails on the merits, has no right of appeal.
106. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 114 F.3d 1547, 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1997), holding abrogated by Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
107. The Federal Circuit’s summary denials of Markman ruling appeals do not explain the
reasons for the denial. Judge Newman’s concurring opinion in Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1478-81,
suggests that the Federal Circuit prefers to review claim construction in a fully developed record.
However, the Federal Circuit routinely reviews claim construction on appeals from preliminary
injunctions without a fully developed record. See, e.g., Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy–
Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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collateral estoppel.108 The Markman court’s policy justification for treating
claim construction as an issue of law for the courts—to promote uniformity
and public notice functions—would also appear to support treating Markman
claim construction as a “final” interpretation of claims even when the
Markman ruling is interlocutory. This interlocutory finality would also accord
with the majority view of finality under Lummus.
Although the Federal Circuit has flirted with the notion that an order need
not be appealable to be accorded finality for collateral estoppel purposes, it has
not held that collateral estoppel applies to any such interlocutory order. Judge
Newman recognized in Interconnect Planning109 that a prior decision need not
be final in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pertaining to the appealability of final
orders, but that the prior adjudication, if “sufficiently firm,” may be accorded
conclusive effect.110 She then went on, however, to hold that an interlocutory
order of patent invalidity was not entitled to preclusive effect because the court
failed to direct entry of final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b).111 This distinction is unsound, however, as Rule 54(b) is to
the same effect as 28 U.S.C. § 1291.112
In sum, the TM Patents and Security Peoples approach to finality best
reflects the policies of Markman and the majority view that finality does not
require a final appealable judgment, as long as the patentee has had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate claim construction issues, as discussed below.
D. Whether the Party Against Whom Estoppel Is Asserted Had A Full and
Fair Opportunity to Litigate In the Prior Court Proceeding
In the TM Patents case there was no doubt that the parties had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate claim construction issues before the first district
court. All parties were given the opportunity to brief the issues fully and the
court held a hearing and received testimony before issuing its Markman
ruling.113 In Graco, whether the parties had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate claim construction at the district court level was not an issue except to

108. The court in Allen-Bradley Co., L.L.C. v. Kollmorgen Corp., 199 F.R.D. 316, 320 (E.D.
Wisc. 2001), refused to vacate its Markman claim construction following settlement, noting that
the law on the preclusive effect of its Markman ruling is unsettled, but that the court’s claim
construction “serves a valuable systemic purpose” and “might be of some yet undefined
assistance to other judges and litigants in the future.” Id.
109. Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
110. Id. at 1135.
111. Id. at 1135-36.
112. Security People, Inc. v. Medeco Security Locks, Inc., 59 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
113. TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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the extent that the patentee had the “opportunity or incentive to appeal.”114
This issue arose because the patentee apparently lost on the issue of claim
construction but won on the issue of infringement.115 The court was troubled
that in these circumstances the patentee could not appeal the Markman ruling
as of right. Relying on pre–Markman Federal Circuit case law, the Graco
court declined to permit an accused infringer to bind the patentee to the claim
construction decided in the prior case. The TM Patents court considered the
same case law but found it inconsistent with Markman and rejected it for this
reason.116
Setting aside the correctness of the Graco holding, the Graco case raises
the important issue of whether a patent holder should be bound by a Markman
ruling in a subsequent case, regardless of the outcome of the earlier case. If the
patent holder loses the first case, there is clearly a full and fair opportunity to
litigate, as the patent holder has a right to appeal and to seek correction of any
error. When the patent holder loses on claim construction in the first case—
where the court rejects the claim construction advocated by the patentee—is it
fair nevertheless to bind the patentee holder to the first claim construction in
later cases.117
Two Federal Circuit cases inform this inquiry. First, in Pharmacia &
Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,118 the Federal Circuit affirmed a
district court’s grant of collateral estoppel on the issue of a patent’s invalidity
and unenforceability as by a jury verdict in a prior case. At the time collateral
estoppel was applied, however, the jury’s verdict in the first case was the
subject of a pending JMOL/new trial motion. There was thus no final
appealable judgment, and the patentee had no right of appeal at that point. The
Federal Circuit held that “the district court did not err in applying collateral
estoppel. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, shields a
defendant from having to litigate issues that have been fully and fairly tried in
a previous action and decided adversely to a party.”119
114. Graco Children’s Products, Inc. v. Regalo Int’l., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 2d 660, 664 (E.D. Pa.
1999).
115. Id.
116. TM Patents, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 378-79.
117. It is important to distinguish that this was not the issue in Graco. In Graco, an appeal
was taken on the first case and the parties settled before the Federal Circuit ruled on the appeal.
When an appeal is taken on the issue of infringement, the Federal Circuit reviews claim
construction de novo as part of the two step test for infringement. Infringement cannot be
determined except on properly construed claims. Thus, the issue of claim construction was
before the court in Graco and will always be before the court in any appeal. Thus, the Graco
court should have decided the application of collateral estoppel on the same reasoning as the TM
Patents court. Upon settlement, both parties to the appeal voluntarily relinquished their rights to
review.
118. 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
119. Id. at 1379.
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The Federal Circuit noted that the district court qualified its holding “by
stating that a judgment of invalidity will have no collateral estoppel effect if
the patentee can show that it did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate.”120 Thus, it appears that the district court at the very least invited the
patentee to show that it had not been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the first time.121 The patentee pressed one such argument before the Federal
Circuit. It argued that the jury in the first case “failed to grasp the subject
matter” of the invention.122 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, finding
that the first court’s “comprehensive Opinion and Order . . . leaves no question
that, as a matter of law, Upjohn was in fact accorded a full and fair opportunity
to litigate.”123
The Federal Circuit went further, however, finding that “our role is limited
to reviewing the district court’s application of collateral estoppel, not the
correctness of the jury verdict in [the first case].”124 The Federal Circuit
explained:
Under Blonder-Tongue, a district court’s inquiry into whether the plaintiff was
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate is quite narrow and does not
involve a judgment on the merits: it is clear from the case law that has
developed since Blonder-Tongue that an inappropriate inquiry is whether the
prior finding of invalidity was correct; instead, the court is only to decide
whether the patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the validity of
his patent in the prior unsuccessful suit.125

The Federal Circuit’s opinion suggests, appropriately, that it is the district
court that decides whether the application of collateral estoppel is proper, and
it is the district court that should undertake the inquiry concerning whether the
patentee was accorded a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first case.126

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1380.
122. Id.
123. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 170 F.3d at 1380.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. A case decided shortly after Blonder-Tongue illustrates the correct analysis. In
Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Kawneer Co., 482 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit was faced
with two prior decisions concerning the validity of the same patent. The first decided case
(district court) found the patent valid. The second decided case (on appeal), but actually the first
case filed, found the patent invalid. The accused infringer in a third action invoked collateral
estoppel based upon the earlier determination of invalidity. The Fifth Circuit upheld collateral
estoppel noting that contrary decisions in the first decided case did not create an exception to
Blonder-Tongue collateral estoppel. Id. at 548. The question of the ultimate merits of the
invalidity decision was not itself at issue. Rather, the issue was whether the patentee had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate. The contrary decisions simply signaled that the court considering
estoppel should carefully apply the “full and fair criteria.” Id. at 548-49. The prior contrary
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Under Blonder-Tongue, this inquiry is quite substantive, as it is meant to
be a “safeguard” against the improvident use of collateral estoppel.127 Before
collateral estoppel applies, the patentee (or party against whom estoppel is
asserted) “must be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that he did not have a
fair opportunity procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to pursue his
claim the first time.”128
The Supreme Court mentioned several factors that come into play in
determining whether a patentee had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
first time. In addition to whether the patentee litigated in his chosen forum,
and had an incentive to fully litigate, a court may consider: (a) whether the first
court made the pertinent legal inquiries; (b) whether opinions filed in the first
case (including a reviewing court’s opinion, if any) indicates whether the prior
case was one of those rare instances where the courts failed to grasp the
technical subject matter and issues in suit; and (c) whether without fault of his
own the patentee was deprived of crucial evidence or witnesses in the first
litigation.129
In the claim construction context, a court considering collateral estoppel
can readily make these inquiries. The court will have before it the written
record supporting a first court’s claim construction, comprised generally of
briefs, affidavits, hearing transcripts, and a written opinion considering the
record and construing the claims.130 Given the fact that a second court will
have the tools at hand to determine whether a patentee was accorded a full and
fair opportunity to litigate claim construction matters, there would seem to be
no justification for not permitting a second court, whether a trial court or the
Federal Circuit, from allowing the collateral estoppel effect of a Markman
ruling after a Blonder-Tongue inquiry. If interlocutory orders that reflect a trial
court’s final decision on the matter may be accorded preclusive effect on the
issues decided—which is the majority rule—then a Markman ruling likewise
should be permitted preclusive effect if there was a full and fair opportunity to
litigate.
The closest the Federal Circuit has come to granting preclusive effect to an
issue considered final by the trial court is the court’s recent holding in
Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc.131 In Pharmacia,
the court held that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of an earlier invalidity
decision did not “undermine the numerous policy reasons expounded in Blonder-Tongue in favor
of applying estoppel.” Id. at 549.
127. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
128. Id. at 333.
129. Id.
130. See Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 515 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1975)
(applying Blonder–Tongue factors when deciding collateral estoppel effect of earlier invalidity
judgment).
131. 170 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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judgment even though that judgment was, at the time, the subject of post-trial
motions and a subsequent appeal. The Federal Circuit found that the patentee
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of validity, as evidenced by
the first trial court’s “comprehensive Opinion and Order.”132 The possibility of
an appeal does not rob the judgment of its collateral estoppel effect.133 The
Federal Circuit also noted that “the law is well settled that the pendency of an
appeal has no effect on the finality or binding effect of a trial court’s
holding.”134 Thus, under Pharmacia, a trial court’s judgment has preclusive
effect from the point at which it is entered despite pending pretrial motions, the
possibility of appeal or the pendency of an appeal.
The final Federal Circuit case of note is Burke, Inc. v. Bruno Independent
Living Aids, Inc.135 In that case, the patentee sued accused infringer A in a first
action. The Federal Circuit reversed the first trial court twice, in
nonprecedential opinions, on claim construction of both the original patent and
then a reissue patent. The patentee then sued accused infringer B on the
reissue patent and the second trial court granted collateral estoppel on claim
construction based on the first trial court’s construction of the reissue patent.
On appeal of the second trial court’s decision of non-infringement, the Federal
Circuit held that its nonprecedential opinion rule, Fed. Cir. R. 47.6(b), “does
not unconditionally prohibit citation of nonprecedential opinions but instead
permits citation of such opinions for limited purposes.”136 Relying on
Markman, the court continued: “[i]n this case, the interest of consistency in the
construction of patent claims would be ill served by interpreting Rule 47.6(b)
to preclude consideration of a prior claim construction rendered as a matter of
law by this court.”137 While the Federal Circuit did not use the term collateral
estoppel, its decision clearly employs this doctrine with regard to its earlier
claim construction opinion.138 In construing claim one of the reissue patent,
the Federal Circuit noted “this court previously construed the term ‘floor pan’
in Burke II.”139 The Federal Circuit then adopted this construction against the
accused infringer in the second case, despite the fact that the accused infringer
had never litigated the issue in the trial court because the trial court had relied
upon collateral estoppel. The Federal Circuit was not reviewing the trial
court’s claim construction. Rather, the Federal Circuit simply gave collateral
estoppel effect to its earlier construction in a case against a different defendant.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1380.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
183 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1337.
Id.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
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This case suggests that at least when the Federal Circuit has construed a patent
claim, it views this construction as the proper one for all purposes.
The Burke and Pharmacia cases, taken together, support an affirmance of
the TM Patents case and a reversal of the Graco case, should either reach the
Federal Circuit on the issue of collateral estoppel. The only issue left open by
these two cases is the finality of an interlocutory Markman ruling when the
parties settle. The Supreme Court’s decision in Bonner Mall suggests that
settlement imparts finality to an otherwise final Markman ruling, at least on the
facts of both TM Patents and Graco. Under Bonner Mall, settlement
constitutes a waiver of any right of appeal, and the issues finally decided prior
to settlement should have preclusive effect if the ultimate Blonder-Tongue
requirement, a full and fair opportunity to litigate the first time, is met.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Extending the collateral estoppel effect to Markman rulings when the
parties have settled implicates three sets of interests: those of the litigants, the
public and third parties. These interests likewise implicate significant policies:
protecting patent rights, fostering competition in technologies not protected by
patents, providing competitors and inventors with notice of the scope of patent
rights, encouraging settlement and conserving private and judicial resources.
Patentees would arguably disfavor extending collateral estoppel effect to
Markman rulings because prior Markman rulings would be asserted against
them. Patentees would most often prefer to freely litigate claim construction
against each new defendant without constraint for several reasons. First, a
patentee would prefer to tailor its claim construction arguments to most
directly capture the accused device at issue. Second, if a patentee is the
financially stronger party, the patentee may gain an advantage from forcing an
accused infringer to expend the substantial sums necessary to litigate claim
construction. The patentee is generally more familiar with its patent, has its
experts in place, and has learned the strengths and weaknesses of its case in
prior litigation. An accused infringer, in contrast, must evaluate the claims
(often with significant time pressures), retain experts, perhaps conduct tests,
and generally focus its corporate and legal resources on the critical task of
claim construction.
A patentee would also prefer to evaluate the merits of settling its first
infringement suit without regard to the potential collateral estoppel effect of a
Markman ruling. A patentee would argue that its incentive to settle based
upon the merits and economics of a particular case would be distorted if the
patentee must also consider the collateral estoppel effect of a Markman ruling.
An accused infringer might well agree if the patentee’s willingness to settle
was negatively influenced by the potential collateral estoppel effect of the
Markman ruling.
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Future accused infringers—third parties to the Markman ruling at issue—
would favor a broad application of collateral estoppel to prior Markman
rulings. If the prior Markman ruling was advantageous to the accused
infringer, the accused infringer would assert collateral estoppel. If the prior
Markman ruling was not advantageous, the accused infringer would be free to
argue it was in error if the patentee raised the Markman ruling in support of its
proposed claim construction.140
The accused infringer in the second action would also favor collateral
estoppel because of the significant cost advantages. By relying upon the
earlier Markman ruling, the accused infringer could greatly reduce his defense
costs, permitting him to focus upon a comparison of the accused device to the
earlier claim construction and other defenses. Moreover, the duration of the
case would be shortened and the opportunity for an early summary judgment
ruling enhanced if a second Markman ruling could be avoided. The accused
infringer would also argue that the likelihood of settlement would increase as
most if not all claim construction issues would have been determined, and thus
the respective strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case would be evident
earlier in the case.
Between these opposing interests lies the public interest. Patent policy
favors the protection of patent rights. While patents are presumed valid,
however, no such presumption attaches to claim construction. Rather, the
public interest favors a clear delineation of the scope of the patent grant, and
claim construction advances this interest. Thus, it would seem that if a
patentee has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate claim
construction, the public interest would be served by adhering to that claim
construction so as to put competitors and inventors practicing in the same field
of art on notice of the legitimate scope of patent rights and thus the inventions
from which they are foreclosed. Such notice would also arguably encourage
competitors to seek a license rather than risk litigation, thus protecting the
patentee’s legitimate interests.
The public interest is also served by a rule that conserves private and
judicial resources as long as the rule does not unfairly burden other interests.
The modulating principle here, again, is that parties must be given a full and
fair opportunity to litigate their claims. It is through this safeguard that the
public can gain confidence that the protection of patent rights and notice of the
scope of those rights remain paramount interests.
The public interest in fostering settlement is arguably premised most
basically upon the conservation of private and judicial resources. Private and
judicial resources are used most efficiently when directed to disputes that the

140. To the extent that a patentee found an earlier claim construction advantageous, it would
cite the earlier Markman ruling for its persuasive effect.
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parties cannot themselves resolve. A policy favoring settlement therefore
encourages the most efficient use of judicial and private resources.
Lastly, the public interest favors finality. Like other policy interests, the
interest in finality must balance the interest of the efficient use of private and
judicial resources with the interest in according litigants the opportunity to
fully and fairly litigate their claims. When litigants have been accorded such a
full and fair opportunity to litigate, a second bite at the same claims is not
warranted. A policy of finality encourages litigants to use the judicial system
efficiently to determine their respective rights and obligations based upon the
expectation that finality is the goal. This expectation of finality discourages
plaintiffs from bringing strategic or weak cases and encourages an early
settlement of cases that for some reason do not merit full advocacy. Full and
fair advocacy also serves the social utility of judicial decision-making and
results in decisions that can be relied upon by third parties.
The Supreme Court has examined these interests in two significant cases
that bear on the application of collateral estoppel to Markman rulings when the
parties have settled: Blonder-Tongue and Bonner Mall. In Blonder Tongue, the
Supreme Court held that a patentee whose patent has been held invalid in a
first action may not relitigate the issue of validity in a second action against a
different defendant unless the patentee can show that he “did not have a fair
opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his claim the
first time.”141 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court examined patent
policy, the economic costs of permitting relitigation of a decided question of
patent validity, and the burden on the courts of permitting relitigation of a
previously decided invalidity determination.142
The Court recognized the congressional purpose of rewarding inventors
through the patent system and the presumption of validity that attaches to an
issued patent.143 The Court further acknowledged the complexity of patent
litigation and the uncertainty that may attach to judicial decisions because of
the difficult issues often presented in such litigation.144 As the Court aptly
noted, however, there is no reason to expect that a second district court would
decide an issue more accurately than the first.145 Nor are most issues related to
a patent more difficult than issues arising in other areas which are routinely
decided by the federal courts.146 Finally, as the Court noted, if the patentee is
the plaintiff in the first action, he chose the time and place to sue, and was
presumably prepared to litigate to the finish. The patentee would have every

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971).
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331, 335.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 331-32.
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 332.
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incentive to put before the court in the first action all relevant evidence and
argument on his claims and defenses.147
Thus, the Supreme Court found nothing in patent policy, or the nature of
patent litigation itself, that would counsel against applying collateral estoppel
to a patent validity determination. This same conclusion holds equally for a
judicial determination of claim construction resulting from a Markman ruling.
A Markman ruling determines the proper scope of a patent, rather than its
validity. Thus, the statutory presumption of validity does not apply. However,
like a validity determination, claim construction deals with the proper scope of
patent protection. The underlying policy issues are the same as to both
determinations. Only a properly construed claim defining the scope of
invention should be protected by the patent laws. Competition should be
restrained only to the extent of a properly construed claim, and the public as
well as competitors have an interest in testing not only the validity of a patent
but also its proper scope.148 As the Supreme Court stated in Blonder-Tongue:
“[t]he patent is a privilege. But it is a privilege which is conditioned by a
public purpose. It results from invention and is limited to the invention which
it defines.”149
Establishing the scope of patent claims is clearly in the public interest and
serves fundamental patent policy. Thus, a decision on the scope of the patent
claims at issue in a first suit deserves binding effect to the same extent as a
decision on invalidity.
Economic considerations also favor according collateral estoppel effect to
Markman rulings. Patent litigation is extraordinarily expensive.150 The costs
of defending a patent infringement suit can be staggering, especially to a small
business.151 The cost alone of marshaling a defense creates an incentive to
settle. Thus, an accused infringer may find settlement the only practical
option, even when the merits of the suit are questionable.152 Permitting an
accused infringer the benefit of a prior claim construction determination would
147. Id.
148. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664-67 (1969) (licensees may challenge the validity
of the licensed invention; competition should not be repressed by worthless patents).
149. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 344. The Supreme Court further emphasized the
importance of finality of invalidity determinations in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton
International, 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Circuit’s routine practice of vacating a district court’s determination on patent invalidity (or
validity) as moot when the Federal Circuit finds noninfringement was in error. This practice, the
Court found, creates a potential for wasteful relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on
competitors who are convinced that a patent has correctly been found invalid. Id. at 100-01.
Relying upon Blonder-Tongue, the Court also emphasized the importance to the public at large of
resolving questions of patent validity. Id. at 100.
150. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 334-39.
151. Id. at 334.
152. Id. at 334-35.
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greatly reduce the cost of litigation and encourage a decision on the merits. A
patentee, likewise, would save the litigation costs associated with relitigating
claim construction issues. The time and dollars saved could arguably be
allocated to a more productive use, such as research and development.153
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court was concerned in Blonder-Tongue
with the incentive a patentee might have to extract royalties from competitors
absent collateral estoppel of a previous invalidity determination.154 Some
alleged infringers would elect to pay royalties to avoid costly litigation even
when a patent had been declared invalid. Those accused infringers would be
placed at a competitive disadvantage compared with those who could afford to
litigate or who had obtained a judgment of invalidity.155 Consumers would be
burdened with higher costs for products sold by those companies paying forced
royalties or engaging in needless litigation challenging a patent already
declared invalid.156 This reality would also create barriers to entry for new
firms, especially smaller ones, faced with the prospect of higher entry costs
that again would ultimately be borne by consumers.157
These economic considerations apply with equal force to claim
construction. If a patent has been construed by a court to grant narrower rights
than advocated by the patentee, the patentee that seeks through repeated
litigation to expand his patent rights creates the same potential for market
distortion and foreclosure as the patentee that seeks to relitigate an invalidity
determination.
The Supreme Court considered the final policy issues, balancing the public
interest in promoting settlement and finality in Bonner Mall. There, the Court
brought an end to the appellate court practice of vacating district court
opinions when the parties settled while an appeal was pending.158 The Court
held that when parties moot an appeal by settling, they voluntarily relinquish
any right of appeal and surrender any right to equitable vacatur, except in
exceptional circumstances.159
The Supreme Court began its policy analysis in Bonner Mall by noting that
“[j]udicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal
community as a whole.”160 Thus, the practice of vacating a district court
decision merely because its appeal is mooted by settlement erases a

153. Id. at 338.
154. Id. at 345-46.
155. Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 346.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 347.
158. U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994).
159. Id. at 24-26, 28-29.
160. Id. at 26 (citing Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 US
27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Izumi case presented the same issue decided in
Bonner Mall, but was dismissed by the Supreme Court on technical grounds.
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presumptively correct legal precedent and with it the potential collateral
estoppel effect of issues decided by the district court.161 While the Supreme
Court did not directly discuss the effect of vacatur on collateral estoppel, it
noted that “vacatur clears the path for future relitigation of the issues. . .”162
The court was very much aware of the relationship. The year before it decided
Bonner Mall, the Court was presented with virtually the same question decided
by Bonner Mall, but in a different context: where vacatur denied a plaintiff in
another case the benefit of collateral estoppel.163
The Court found it contrary to the public interest to permit the parties to
obtain vacatur of an otherwise final decision by the district court simply
because they had waived their right to appeal. This would amount to a
“refined form of collateral attack on the judgment” and “disturb the orderly
operation of the federal judicial system.”164 Commentators have gone farther
in this regard, arguing strongly that the practice of routine vacatur allows
disappointed parties to control the direction and content of judicial precedent,
weeding out the negative precedent and preserving the positive.165 The
practice threatens the fairness of judicial decision-making by enabling litigants
with deep pockets who are repeat players on the same issues to purchase
favorable legal rulings.166 Such litigants can sue new defendants until the
desired result is reached, expunging through settlement adverse rulings along
the way.167
The petitioner in Bonner Mall argued that vacatur was justified because it
would facilitate settlement. The Supreme Court was unconvinced. While the
Court acknowledged that vacatur might encourage settlement after an appeal
was filed or certiorari granted, it could deter settlement at an earlier stage.168

161. Id. at 26-27; U.S. Philips Corp. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 55 F.3d 592, 598 (Fed. Cir.
1995). But see Bates v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 1005 (1992) (vacatur alone does not bar preclusive effect of issues decided in vacated
decision).
162. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 22.
163. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27 (1993).
Both the parties and the Court focused in depth upon this issue. See Appellant’s and
Respondent’s briefs, 1993 WL 289863; 1993 WL 289867; 1993 WL 625899; Transcript of Oral
Argument, 1993 WL 757650.
164. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27.
165. J. Resnick, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the
Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1491-92
(1994).
166. A. Tulumello, Shopping for Legal Precedent Through Settlement-Related Vacatur, 1
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 213 (1994).
167. Id. at 220.
168. Bonner Mall, 513 U.S. at 27-28.
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Encouraging settlement at the earliest stages of litigation promises the greatest
judicial economies.169
The policy interests considered in Bonner Mall weigh in favor of according
collateral estoppel effect to Markman rulings when parties settle. A Markman
ruling, fully and fairly litigated at the district court level, is a final resolution of
claim construction. If the parties settle after this final determination, the
Markman ruling, like a final judgment, is not reviewable at the parties’
election. Whatever precedential or collateral estoppel effect it may have
should be determined in the discretion of a later case, and upon a BlonderTongue inquiry, if collateral estoppel is at issue. The Markman ruling is not
erased by settlement.
If the parties to an infringement suit do not wish to risk the future collateral
estoppel effect of a Markman ruling, they have two options. First, they may
settle before a Markman ruling is issued. Alternatively, they may request that
the district court vacate the ruling. The Supreme Court in Bonner Mall
expressly acknowledged this option. Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order for good
cause.170
V. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that both policy and precedent favor extending collateral
estoppel to Markman rulings under the circumstances presented in both TM
Patents and Graco. A more difficult question is presented when the patentee
prevails in the district court and the parties do not settle and the infringer does
not appeal. In these instances, there is arguably no avenue through which the
patentee can obtain review of the district court’s claim construction. However,
if the Federal Circuit changed its current policy of never reviewing an
interlocutory Markman ruling, an avenue for review would emerge.
Alternatively, if a patentee loses on claim construction but wins on
infringement, it could be argued that the Markman ruling in this instance is
analogous to an invalidity determination. The patentee has lost the scope of
patent protection to which he believes he is entitled. Under the teachings of
Cardinal Chemical, a patentee might argue that there is a sufficient case or
controversy to merit an appeal of an adverse Markman ruling.171 Thus, a
patentee that forgoes the opportunity to appeal either an interlocutory
Markman ruling or the Markman ruling independently following final

169. Id. at 28.
170. Id. at 29.
171. See, e.g., Ashley v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals (In re DES Litigation), 7 F.3d
20, 23 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding a prevailing party aggrieved by the collateral estoppel effect of a
district court’s rulings may appeal the rulings if the judgment in the prior action was dependent
upon those rulings).
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judgment, should reasonably be bound by that Markman ruling in future
litigation.
Whatever the posture of the case that ultimately presents the issue of
Markman ruling collateral estoppel to the Federal Circuit, the Federal Circuit
will be faced with both a challenge and opportunity to offer guidance to all
district courts. The Markman ruling follows closely, in terms of importance, to
a determination of patent invalidity in the lexicon of patent precedent. The
question of the collateral estoppel effect of these rulings deserves the same
attention and invokes the same policy considerations as did the issue of the
preclusive effect of a prior invalidity determination considered in BlonderTongue. If the Federal Circuit is to provide the unifying guidance needed in
this area, it must undertake a more searching analysis than is evident in its
current precedent. Arguably, the Federal Circuit must broaden its scope,
returning to Supreme Court precedent and policy under the guidance of
Markman, Blonder-Tongue, Bonner Mall, and perhaps Cardinal Chemical. If
the Federal Circuit accepts the opportunity to offer its far-reaching guidance,
either TM Patents or Graco may soon become a seminal case.
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